Abstract. Multi-context systems are a formalism to interlink decentralized and heterogeneous knowledge based systems (contexts), which interact via (possibly nonmonotonic) bridge rules. Inconsistency is a major problem, as it renders such systems useless. In addition, it is likely that complete knowledge about all system parts is unavailable and cannot be obtained, for instance in applications where confidentiality or trust are prohibitive. We therefore aim at explaining reasons for inconsistency in multi-context systems without having an omniscient view of the whole system. To this end we propose a representation for partial knowledge about contexts, and define over-and underapproximations for existing notions characterizing inconsistency in multi-context systems. Furthermore, we discuss query selection strategies for improving approximations in situations where a limited number of queries can be posed to a partially known context.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in interlinking knowledge bases, in order to enhance the capabilities of systems. Based on McCarthy's idea of contextual reasoning [1] , the Trento School around Giunchiglia and Serafini has developed multi-context systems in many works, in which the components (called contexts) can be interlinked via so called bridge rules for information exchange, cf. [2, 3] . Generalizing this work, Brewka and Eiter [4] presented nonmonotonic multi-context systems (MCSs) as a generic framework for interlinking possibly heterogeneous and nonmonotonic knowledge bases.
Typically, an MCS is not built from scratch, but assembled from components which were not specifically designed to be part of a more complex system. Unintended interactions between contexts thus may easily arise and cause inconsistency, which renders an MCS useless.
To make bridge rules defeasible, similarly as in [5] , may help to avoid inconsistency; this cures faults in silent service, but underlying reasons for inconsistency may remain unnoticed. Therefore, to help the user analyze, understand and eventually repair inconsistencies, suitable notions of consistency-based diagnosis and entailment-based explanation for inconsistency were introduced in [6] . However, an omniscient view of the system was assumed, where the user has full information about all contexts including their knowledge bases and semantics. In real world scenarios, full information may not be available [7] ; a context may be a black box with hidden internal knowledge base and semantics, which are not disclosed (e.g., due to intellectual property or privacy issues). Partial behavior of such contexts may be known, however querying the contexts might be limited, e.g., by contracts or costs. This calls for explaining inconsistency in an MCS with partial knowledge about contexts, which raises the following issues:
-how to represent partial knowledge about the system, and -how to obtain reasonable approximations for explanations of inconsistency in the actual system (under full knowledge), ideally in an efficient way.
The first issue depends on the nature of this knowledge, and a range of possibilities exists. The second issue requires an assessment method to determine such approximations. We tackle these issues and make the following contributions.
• We develop a representation of partially known contexts, which is based on context abstraction with Boolean functions. Partially defined Boolean functions [8, 9] are then used to capture partially known behavior of a context for specific inputs.
• We exploit these representations to determine over-and underapproximations of diagnoses and explanations for inconsistency according to [6] in the presence of partially known contexts. The approximations target either the whole set of diagnoses, or one diagnosis at a time; analogously for explanations.
• For scenarios where partially known contexts can be asked a limited number of queries, we consider query selection strategies.
• Finally, we briefly discuss computational complexity. In contrast to semantic approximations for efficient evaluation, our approximations provide methods for handling incompleteness, which usually increase complexity. However, they do not incur higher computational cost than in the case of full information.
Our results extend methods for inconsistency handling in MCSs to more realistic settings. This allows to identify reasons for inconsistency even if it is impossible to obtain full system knowledge, without increasing computational cost.
Preliminaries
A heterogeneous nonmonotonic MCS [4] consists of contexts, each composed of a knowledge base with an underlying logic, and a set of bridge rules
is an abstraction, which allows to capture many monotonic and nonmonotonic logics, e.g., classical logic, description logics, default logics, etc. It consists of the following components:
-KB L is the set of well-formed knowledge bases of L. We assume each element of KB L is a set of "formulas". -BS L is the set of possible belief sets, where a belief set is a set of "beliefs".
BS L is a function describing the semantics of the logic by assigning to each knowledge base a set of acceptable belief sets.
Each context has its own logic, which allows to model heterogeneous systems.
A bridge rule models information flow between contexts: it can add information to a context, depending on the belief sets accepted at other contexts. Let L = (L 1 , . . . , L n ) be a tuple of logics. An L k -bridge rule r over L is of the form
where 1 ≤ c i ≤ n, p i is an element of some belief set of L ci , and k refers to the context receiving formula s. We denote by hd (r) the formula s in the head of r.
By IN i = {hd (r) | r ∈ br i } we denote the set of possible inputs of context C i added by bridge rules, and by br M = n i=1 br i the set of all bridge rules of M .
In addition, for each
The following running example involves policies and trust information which are often non-public and distributed [7] , and thus demonstrates the necessity of reasoning under incomplete information. For more examples of MCSs see [4, 6] . Example 1. Consider an MCS M consisting of a permission database C 1 = C perm and a credit card clearing context C 2 = C cc , and the following bridge rules:
Here r 1 defines a set of persons which is relevant for permission evaluation in C perm ; r 2 specifies, that if some person is not granted access, credit cards of that person have to be validated; and r 3 translates validation results to C perm .
The MCS formalism is defined on ground bridge rules, which are in the following denoted by r i,<constants> , e.g., r 2,moe,cnr2 denotes r 2 with Person → moe and CreditCard → cnr2 . Unless stated otherwise, we assume that bridge rules are grounded with Person ∈ {nina, moe} and CreditCard ∈ {cnr1 , cnr2 }.
We next describe the context internals: C perm is a datalog program with the following logic: KB perm contains all syntactically correct datalog programs, BS perm contains all possible answer sets, and ACC perm returns for each datalog program the corresponding answer sets. The knowledge base kb perm is as follows:
Context C cc is a credit card clearing facility, which typically is neither fully disclosed to the operator, nor can it be queried without significant cost. C cc accepts valid (CreditCard ) for valid cards that are present as atoms card (CreditCard ). We only know the behavior of C cc for empty input: ACC cc (kb cc ) = {∅}.
Equilibrium semantics selects certain belief states of an MCS M = (C 1 , . . . , C n ) as acceptable. A belief state is a sequence S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ), s.t. S i ∈ BS i . A bridge rule (1) is applicable in S iff for 1 ≤ i ≤ j: p i ∈ S ci and for j < l ≤ m: p l / ∈ S c l . Let app(R, S) denote the set of bridge rules in R that are applicable in belief state S.
Intuitively, an equilibrium is a belief state S, where each context C i takes into account the heads of all bridge rules that are applicable in S, and accepts S i .
Definition 2.
A belief state S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) of M is an equilibrium iff, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the following condition holds:
By EQ(M ) we denote the set of equilibria of M .
Example 2 (ctd).
Assume that M 1 is the MCS M with just person(nina) present at C perm . As nina is in the vip group there is no need to verify a credit card, and M 1 has the following equilibrium (we omit facts, that are present in kb perm ): ({person(nina), igrant(nina), grant(nina)}, ∅).
Inconsistency in an MCS is the lack of an equilibrium. No information can be obtained from an inconsistent MCS. Therefore we analyze inconsistency in order to explain and eventually repair it.
Explanation of Inconsistency. We use the notions of consistency-based diagnosis and entailment-based inconsistency explanation in MCSs [6] , which aim at describing inconsistency by sets of involved bridge rules.
Given an MCS M and a set R of bridge rules, by M [R] we denote the MCS obtained from M by replacing its set of bridge rules br M with R (in particular,
is M with no bridge rules). By M |= ⊥ we denote that M is inconsistent, i.e., EQ(M ) = ∅, and by M |= ⊥ the opposite. For any set of bridge rules A, heads(A) = {α ← | α ← β ∈ A} are the rules in A in unconditional form. For pairs A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and B = (B 1 , B 2 ) of sets, the pointwise subset relation A ⊆ B holds iff A 1 ⊆ B 1 and A 2 ⊆ B 2 . We denote by S| A the projection of all sets X in set S to set A, formally
is the set of all pointwise subset-minimal diagnoses of an MCS M . A diagnosis points out bridge rules which need to be modified to restore consistency; each rule can either be deactivated, or added unconditionally. We assume that context knowledge bases are consistent if no bridge rule heads are added, so restoring consistency is always possible. For more background and discussion of this notion, we refer to [6] . We next give an example of an inconsistent MCS and its diagnoses.
Example 3 (ctd). Let M 2 be the MCS M with just person(moe) present at C perm , and assume the following full knowledge about C cc : all credit cards are valid.
M 2 is inconsistent: moe is not in the vip group, card verification is required by r 2,moe,cnr2 , and C cc accepts valid (cnr2 ). This allows C perm to derive grant(moe), which blocks applicability of r 2,moe,cnr2 . Therefore, M 2 contains an unstable cycle and is inconsistent.
Two ⊆-minimal diagnoses of M 2 are then as follows: ({r 2,moe,cnr2 }, ∅) (do not validate cnr2 ), and (∅, {r 2,moe,cnr2 }) (always validate cnr2 ).
1 This points out r 2 as a likely culprit of inconsistency. Indeed, r 2 should intuitively contain igrant(Person) in its body instead of grant(Person).
In this work we develop an approach which is able to point out a problem in r 2 , without requiring complete knowledge.
Information Hiding
In this section, we introduce an abstraction of contexts which allows to calculate diagnoses and explanations. We generalize this abstraction to represent partial knowledge, i.e., contexts C i , where either kb i , or ACC i is only partially known. Context Abstraction. We abstract from a context's knowledge base kb i and logic L i by a Boolean function over the context's inputs IN i (see Definition 1) and over the context's output beliefs OUT i , which are those beliefs p in BS i that occur in some bridge rule body in br M as "(i:p)" or as "not (i:p)" (see also [6] ).
Recall that a Boolean function (BF) is a map f : B k → B where k ∈ N and B = {0, 1}. Such a BF can also be characterized either by its true points 
Example 4 (ctd).
We use the following (ordered) sets for inputs and output beliefs:
Definition 4. The unique BF f
Ci : B |IN i|+|OUT i| → B corresponds to the semantics of context C i in an MCS M as follows:
Example 5 (ctd). With full knowledge (see Example 3), C cc has as corresponding BF the function f Ccc (X, Y, X, Y ) = 1 for all X, Y ∈ B, 0 otherwise.
If a context accepts a belief set O for a given input I, we obtain the true point
Similarly, each non-accepted belief set yields a false point of f . Due to projection, different accepted belief sets can characterize the same true point.
Consistency Checking. Context abstraction provides sufficient information to calculate output-projected equilibria of the given MCS. Hence, it also allows for checking consistency and calculating diagnoses and explanations. Given a belief state S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) in MCS M , the output-projected belief state S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ), S i = S i ∩ OUT i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is the projection of S to the output beliefs of M . In the following, we implicitly use the prime " " to denote output-projection.
Definition 5 (see also [6] ). An output-projected belief state S = (S 1 , . . . , S n ) of an MCS M is an output-projected equilibrium iff, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it holds that
. By EQ (M ) we denote the set of output-projected equilibria of M .
Since app(br i , S) = app(br i , S ), a simple consequence is:
Lemma 1 ( [6] ). For each equilibrium S of an MCS M , S is an output-projected equilibrium; conversely, for each output-projected equilibrium S of M there exists at least one equilibrium T of M such that T = S .
Checking consistency is therefore possible using output-projected equilibria only. The representation of a context by a BF provides an input/output oracle, projected to output beliefs. As only output beliefs are relevant for bridge rule applicability, the BF is sufficient for calculating output-projected equilibria, and due to Lemma 1 also for checking consistency.
An MCS where a context is represented by a BF f is denoted as follows.
which contains the set br i of bridge rules, a logic with a signature that contains IN i ∪ OUT i , and kb C(f ) and
For instance, C(f ) could be based on classical logic or logic programming, with kb C(f ) over IN ∪ OU T as atoms encoding f by clauses (rules) that realize the correspondence.
We now show that a BF representation of a context is sufficient for calculating output-projected equilibria. We denote by
. . , C n ) be an MCS, and let f i1 , . . . , f i k be BFs that correspond to C i1 , . . . ,
. . , C n ), such that C i = C i for non-substituted contexts, and br i = br i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The latter also implies IN i = IN i and OUT i = OUT i , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
By Definition 5, EQ (M ) = EQ (M ) if the following condition (i) holds: for each pair (C
This trivially holds for non-substituted contexts. So let C i = C(f i ) be an arbitrary substituted context. By construction it holds that f C i = f i . Furthermore, each f i corresponds to its respective C i , so
Ci is defined in a 1-1 relationship to ACC i (kb i ∪ H)| OUT i for all H ⊆ IN i (see Definition 4), we obtain that (i) holds for all substituted contexts.
Partially Known Contexts. As the BF representation concerns only output beliefs, by simply using this abstraction we already hide a part of the context, while we are still able to analyze inconsistency. Now we generalize the BF representation to partially defined Boolean functions (pdBFs) (cf. [8, 9] ), to represent contexts where we have only partial knowledge about their output-projected behavior.
In applications, existence of such partial knowledge is realistic: for some bridge rule firings one may know an accepted belief set of a context, but not whether other accepted belief sets exist. Similarly one may know that a context is inconsistent for some input combination, but not whether it accepts some belief set for other input combinations.
Formally, a pdBF pf is a function from B k to B ∪ { }, where stands for undefined (cf. [8] ). It is equivalently characterized by two sets [9] : its true points T (pf ) = { x | pf ( x) = 1} and its false points
We connect partial knowledge of context semantics and pdBFs as follows. In the following, a partially known MCS (M, i, pf ) consists of an MCS M , where context C i is partially known, given by pdBF pf which is compatible with C i .
Approximations
In this section, we develop a method for calculating under-and overapproximations of diagnoses and explanations, using the pdBF representation for a partially known context C i . For simplicity, we only consider the case that a single context in the system is partially known (the generalization is straightforward). Diagnoses. Each diagnosis is defined in terms of consistency, which is witnessed by an output-projected equilibrium. Such an equilibrium requires a certain set of output beliefs O to be accepted by the context C i , in the presence of certain bridge rule heads I. This means that f Ci has true point ( i, o). For existence of an equilibrium where C i gets I as input and accepts O, no more information is required from f Ci than this single true point. We can approximate the set of diagnoses of M as follows:
• Completing pf with false points, we obtain the extension pf with T (pf ) = T (pf ). The set of diagnoses witnessed by T (pf ) contains a subset of the diagnoses which actually occur in M , therefore we obtain an under approximation.
• Completing pf with true points, we obtain the extension pf which contains the largest set of true points in an extension of pf . The set of diagnoses witnessed by this extension contains a superset of the diagnoses which actually occur in M , providing an over approximation. Formally, Theorem 2. Given a partially known MCS (M, i, pf ), the following holds: D 2 ) is a diagnosis, M has at least one witnessing output-projected equilibrium S . At context C i , S contains a certain set of output beliefs O = S i , furthermore the set of active bridge rule heads at C i is I = app(br i , S ).
Because S is an output-projected equilibrium, we have that O ∈ ACC i (kb i ∪ I)| OUT i , so pf has a true point at ( i, o). Since pf is compatible with C i , some extension of pf is equal to f Ci . Moreover, every true point of pf is a true point of pf , therefore every true point of pf is a true point of f Ci . Consequently, C i accepts some S for input I where O = S ∩ OUT i , which proves that (
is proved similarly: no true point of f Ci is a false point of pf , and thus neither of pf . Consequently, all true points of f Ci are true points of pf . Hence, all accepted input-output "behaviors" of context C i are accepted in the overapproximation, and therefore each diagnosis in
, as well.
Example 7 (ctd).
The extensions pf cc and pf cc are as follows:
T (pf cc ) = T (pf cc ), and
The underapproximation D ± (M 2 [cc/pf cc ]) yields several diagnoses, e.g., D α = ({r 1,moe }, ∅), D β = ({r 2,moe,cnr2 }, ∅), and D γ = (∅, {r 3,cnr2 }).
The overapproximation D ± (M 2 [cc/pf cc ]) contains the empty diagnosis D δ = (∅, ∅), because M 2 [cc/pf cc ] is consistent; it has the following two equilibria: ({person(moe)}, ∅) and ({person(moe)}, {valid (cnr1 )}).
Subset-minimality. If we approximate ⊆-minimal diagnoses, the situation is different. Obtaining additional diagnoses may cause approximated minimal diagnoses to become smaller. Missing certain diagnoses can make approximated minimal diagnoses larger.
Therefore, the following holds for ⊆-minimal diagnosis approximations.
Theorem 3. Given a partially known MCS (M, i, pf ), the following hold: (2) . (3) This is proved by analogous arguments.
Example 8 (ctd).
Note that the diagnoses in Example 7 are in fact the ⊆-minimal diagnoses of the under-and overapproximation, and that they are actual ⊆-minimal diagnoses. Under complete knowledge (see Example 3), there are additional ⊆-diagnoses which are not members of the underapproximation. The overapproximation, on the other hand, yields a consistent system and therefore an empty ⊆-minimal diagnosis D δ . In Section 5 we develop a strategy for improving this approximation if limited querying of the context is possible.
We can use the overapproximation to reason about the necessity of bridge rules in actual diagnoses: a necessary bridge rule is present in all diagnoses. 
Proposition 1. Given a partially known MCS (M, i, pf ), the set of necessary bridge rules for the overapproximation is necessary in the actual set of diagnoses. This is true for both arbitrary and ⊆-minimal diagnoses:
. Thus, if a bridge rule is contained in all diagnoses of the latter set, it must also be contained in all diagnoses of the former.
Next, we prove nec(D
While simple, this property is useful in practice: in a repair of an MCS according to a diagnosis, necessary bridge rules need to be fixed in any case. Inconsistency explanations. So far we have only described approximations for diagnoses. Inconsistency explanations are a dual notion; they allow to separate independent sources of inconsistency. We first recall the definition from [6] .
we denote the set of all inconsistency explanations of M , and by E ± m (M ) the set of all pointwise subset-minimal ones. An inconsistency explanation (in short 'explanation') points out bridge rules E 1 which suffice to ensure inconsistency, and bridge rules E 2 which must not be added unconditionally to sustain inconsistency.
Example 9.
With complete knowledge as in Example 3, there is one ⊆-minimal explanation: ({r 1,moe , r 2,moe,cnr2 , r 3,cnr2 }, {r 2,moe,cnr2 , r 3,cnr2 }).
Explanations are defined in terms of non-existing equilibria, therefore we can use witnessing equilibria as counterexamples. From the definitions we get:
Proposition 2. For a given MCS M and a pair (D 1 , D 2 ) ⊆ br M × br M of sets of bridge rules, the following statements are equivalent:
] has an equilibrium, and
Furthermore, such pairs (D 1 , D 2 ) characterize all counterexamples that can exist for explanation candidates.
Proof (sketch). Equivalence of (i) and (ii) is a straightforward consequence of Definition 3. Equivalence of (ii) and (iii) follows from Definition 9. Suppose (ii) holds, and towards a contradiction assume that (
and by Definition 9 it holds that
, and by assumption the latter has an equilibrium. Therefore, (ii) implies (iii). On the other hand, (iii) implies that M [R 1 ∪ heads(R 2 )] has an equilibrium, i.e., that
] has an equlibrium, proving (iii) implies (ii).
As a consequence, it is possible to characterize explanations in terms of diagnoses.
Proof (sketch). The only-if direction is a direct consequence of Definition 9. For the if direction suppose that there does not exist (
In fact we can sharpen the above by replacing D ± with D ± m . Using this characterization, we can infer the following: a subset of the actual set of diagnoses characterizes a superset of the actual set of explanations. This is true since a subset of diagnoses will rule out a subset of explanations, allowing more candidates to become explanations. Conversely, a superset of diagnoses characterizes a subset of the explanations. Applying Theorem 2, we obtain: Theorem 4. Given a partially known MCS (M, i, pf ), the following hold:
. By the characterization of explanations in terms of counterexamples, this theorem follows from Theorems 2 and 3 and from Lemma 2 by the following set theoretic argument: if a family of counterexamples characterizes a family of sets by ⊆-inclusion (as in Lemma 2), a larger family of counterexamples characterizes a smaller family of sets and vice versa. Therefore, the extensions pf and pf allow to underapproximate and overapproximate diagnoses as well as inconsistency explanations.
Example 10 (ctd). From pf cc as in Example 7 we obtain one ⊆-minimal explanation: E µ = ({r 1,moe , r 2,moe,cnr2 }, {r 3,cnr2 }). This explanation is a subset of the actual minimal explanation in Example 9.
Limited Querying
Up to now we used existing partial knowledge to approximate diagnoses, assuming that more information is simply not available. However, in practical scenarios like our running example, one can imagine that a (small) limited number of queries to a partially known context can be issued. Therefore we next aim at identifying queries to contexts, such that incorporating their answers into the pdBF will yield the best guarantee of improvement in approximation accuracy.
Given a partially known MCS (
be the set of potential diagnoses, which are possible from the overapproximation but unconfirmed by the underapproximation.
A large set of potential diagnoses provides less information than a smaller set. Therefore we aim at identifying unknown points of pf which remove from D ± ∆ as many potential diagnoses as possible. To this end we introduce the concept of a witness, which is an unknown point together with a potential diagnosis that is supported by this point if it is a true point.
Definition 10. Given a partially known MCS (M, i, pf ), a witness is a pair
where f x is the BF with the single true point T (f x ) = { x}. We denote by W (M,i,pf ) the set of all witnesses wrt. (M, i, pf ) . If clear from the context, we omit subscript (M, i, pf ).
Based on W we define the set wnd ( x) = {D | ( x, D) ∈ W } of potential diagnoses witnessed by unknown point x, and the set ewnd ( x) = {D ∈ wnd ( x) | x = x : ( x , D) ∈ W } of potential diagnoses exclusively witnessed by x. These sets are used to investigate how much the set of potential diagnoses is reduced when adding information about the value of an unknown point x to pf . Lemma 3. Given a partially known MCS (M, i, pf ), and x ∈ U (pf ), let pf x:0 (pf x:1 ) the pdBF that results from pf by making x a false (true) point. Then
. If x is a true point, |wnd ( x)| many potential diagnoses become part of the underapproximation; otherwise |ewnd ( x)| many potential diagnoses are no longer part of the overapproximation. Knowing the value of x therefore guarantees a reduction of D ± ∆ by |ewnd ( x)| diagnoses. Proposition 3. Given a partially known MCS (M, i, pf ), for all x ∈ U (pf ) such that the cardinality of ewnd ( x) is maximal, the following holds:
Proof (sketch). Given (M, i, pf ) and x such that |ewnd ( x)| is maximal among x ∈ U (pf ), (5) expresses the following: regardless of whether we obtain that x is a true or a false point of context C i , we have a guaranteed reduction of the set of potential diagnoses, and no other x ∈ U (pf ) can guarantee a greater reduction. Acquiring information about unknown point x has two possible outcomes: (i) x ∈ T (pf ) and the reduction is wnd ( x) ; or (ii) x ∈ F (pf ) and the reduction is ewnd ( x) (see Lemma 3) . As ewnd ( x) ⊆ wnd ( x) (Definition 10), the guaranteed reduction in size is |ewnd ( x)|. The proposition follows, since x is chosen s.t. |ewnd ( x)| is maximal.
Proposition 3 suggests to query unknown points x where |ewnd ( x)| is maximum. If there are more false points than true points (e.g., for contexts that accept only one belief set for each input), using ewnd instead of wnd is even more suggestive.
If the primary interest are necessary bridge rules (cf. previous section), we can base query selection on the number of bridge rules which become necessary if a certain unknown point is a false point. Let
, then |nwnd ( x)| many bridge rules become necessary if x is identified as a false point. established in [6] , depending on the complexity of output checking for contexts C i , which is deciding for C i , I ⊆ IN i and O ⊆ OU T i whether O ∈ ACC(kb i ∪I)| OU Ti . With output checking in P (resp., NP, Σ P k ), recognizing correct diagnoses is in NP (resp., NP, Σ P k ) while recognizing minimal diagnoses and minimal explanations is in D P (resp., D P , D P k ); completeness holds in all cases. Let us first consider the case where some contexts C i are given by their corresponding BF f i (in a representation such that f i ( i, o) can be evaluated efficiently). As we know that context C i accepts only input/output combinations which are true points of f , we simply guess all possible output beliefs O i of all contexts and evaluate bridge rules to obtain I i ; if for some C i as above, f i ( i i , o i )=0 we reject, otherwise we continue checking context acceptance for other contexts. Overall, this leads to the same complexity as if all contexts were total. Thus, detecting explanations of inconsistency for an MCS M , where some contexts are given as BFs, has the same complexity as if M were given regularly.
Approximations are done on an MCS where a pdBF pf is given instead of a BF f , in a representation such that the value of pf ( i, o) can be computed efficiently. This implies that the extensions pf and pf can be computed efficiently as well. Hence, approximations of diagnoses and explanations have the same complexity as the exact concepts. Dealing with incomplete information usually increases complexity, as customary for many nonmonotonic reasoning methods. Our approach, however, exhibits no such increase in complexity, even though it provides faithful under-and overapproximations.
Learning. To learn a BF seems suggestive for our setting of incomplete information. However, explaining inconsistency requires correct information, therefore pac-learning methods [8] are not applicable. On the other hand, exact methods [11] require properties of the contexts which are beneficial to learning and might not be present.
3 Furthermore, contexts may only allow membership queries, which are insufficient for efficient learning of many concept domains [11] . Furthermore, partially known contexts may not allow many, even less a polynomial number of queries (which is the target for learnability).
Most likely it will thus not be possible to learn the complete function. Hence learning cannot replace our approach, but it can be useful as a preprocessing step to increase the amount of partial information.
Related Work and Conclusion
To the best of our knowledge, explaining inconsistency in multi-context systems with partial specification has not been addressed before. Weakly related to our work is [12] , who aimed at approximating abductive diagnoses of a single knowledge base. They replaced classical entailment with approximate entailment of [13] , motivated by computational efficiency. However, there is no lack of information about the knowledge base or semantics as in our case.
Our over-and underapproximations of D ± and E ± are reminiscent of lower and upper bounds of classical theories (viewed as sets of models [14] ), known as cores and envelopes. The latter also were used for (fast) sound, resp. complete, reasoning from classical theories.
The limited querying approach is related to optimal probing strategies [15] . However, we do not require probing to localize faults in the system, but to obtain information about the behavior of system parts, which have a much more fine grained inner structure and more intricate dependencies than the systems in [15] . (Those system parts have as possible states 'up', and 'down', while in MCSs each partially known context possibly accepts certain belief sets for certain inputs.)
Ongoing further work includes an implementation of the approach given in this paper, and the usage of metainformation about context properties to improve approximation accuracy. The incorporation of probabilistic information into the pdBF representation is another interesting topic for future research.
